Bangladesh–India Crisis: Threats to Northeast & India’s Response

Bangladesh India diplomatic crisis over threats to India’s Northeast and the Siliguri Corridor
India–Bangladesh relations face a severe test after threats to the Seven Sisters region

Introduction: A Neighbourly Relationship at Its Lowest Point

India–Bangladesh relations, once held up as a model of constructive neighbourhood diplomacy in South Asia, have entered their most volatile phase in over a decade. What began as a domestic political upheaval in Bangladesh has now evolved into a full-blown diplomatic and security crisis with direct implications for India’s territorial integrity, regional stability, and strategic posture in the eastern subcontinent.

The immediate trigger was a set of incendiary remarks made in December 2025 by a Bangladeshi political leader threatening India’s northeastern states and the Siliguri Corridor. But for New Delhi, the episode represents something far more serious than reckless rhetoric. It signals a profound shift in Dhaka’s internal politics, foreign policy orientation, and tolerance of extremist narratives—developments that India cannot afford to ignore.

From an Indian point of view, the crisis exposes three deeply worrying trends: the erosion of Bangladesh’s long-standing commitment to friendly relations with India, the normalization of anti-India separatist discourse in mainstream Bangladeshi politics, and the emergence of strategic vulnerabilities along one of India’s most sensitive geographic frontiers.

This article examines the crisis in depth—from India’s perspective—by analysing the provocation, New Delhi’s diplomatic and military responses, Bangladesh’s political transformation after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, and the broader geopolitical implications for South Asia.


The Provocation: An Open Threat to India’s Territorial Integrity

On December 16, 2025, Hasnat Abdullah, a leader of Bangladesh’s newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), delivered a speech at Dhaka’s iconic Central Shaheed Minar that crossed a red line for India. Addressing a cheering crowd, Abdullah openly threatened to shelter separatist and anti-India forces and to work toward severing India’s northeastern states—collectively known as the “Seven Sisters”—from the Indian Union.

His statement was unambiguous:

“We will shelter separatist and anti-India forces and then we will sever the seven sisters from India.”

From New Delhi’s standpoint, this was not merely political grandstanding. It was a public endorsement of insurgency, territorial dismemberment, and hostile action against a neighbouring sovereign state—delivered from a national monument associated with Bangladeshi identity.

Even more alarming was Abdullah’s explicit reference to exploiting India’s geographic vulnerability at the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow stretch of land connecting the Northeast to mainland India. By invoking the so-called “Chicken’s Neck,” Abdullah touched upon one of India’s most sensitive strategic chokepoints—a subject traditionally discussed only in military and strategic circles, not by foreign politicians on public stages.

For India, the speech represented a qualitative escalation: from rhetorical hostility to an implicit threat of hybrid warfare using insurgents, geography, and diplomatic pressure.


Why the “Seven Sisters” Threat Is a Red Line for India

India’s northeastern region is not merely a peripheral territory; it is a critical strategic, cultural, and economic component of the Indian Union. The Seven Sisters—Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura—share long international borders with China, Myanmar, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. Stability in this region is essential for India’s Act East policy, border management, and internal cohesion.

From the 1960s through the early 2000s, the Northeast suffered from multiple insurgencies, many of which exploited porous borders and foreign sanctuaries. It was only through sustained counter-insurgency operations, political settlements, and—crucially—cooperation from Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina that India succeeded in dismantling these networks.

Dhaka’s cooperation during the Hasina era—particularly in denying shelter to Indian insurgent groups like ULFA—was a cornerstone of improved bilateral relations. Therefore, for an emerging Bangladeshi political force to openly threaten a reversal of this policy is viewed in New Delhi as a direct assault on decades of painstaking security stabilization.

In Indian strategic thinking, any suggestion of reviving cross-border insurgency is tantamount to a hostile act, regardless of whether it is immediately actionable.


India’s Immediate Diplomatic Response: Firm, Swift, and Unambiguous

New Delhi responded within 24 hours, signalling that it would not tolerate ambiguity on issues of national security.

Summoning the Bangladeshi High Commissioner

On December 17, 2025, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) summoned Bangladesh’s High Commissioner to India, Riaz Hamidullah, to formally convey India’s “strong concerns” over the deteriorating security environment in Bangladesh. This step is reserved for serious diplomatic breaches and was intended to send a clear message: the statements made in Dhaka were unacceptable and dangerous.

India specifically raised alarm over threats by extremist elements to create a security situation around the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. For New Delhi, this was a critical escalation—from rhetorical hostility to potential physical risk to Indian diplomats.

Categorical Rejection of Bangladesh’s Narrative

The MEA publicly rejected what it described as a “false narrative” being promoted by extremist elements within Bangladesh. India reaffirmed a long-standing principle of its foreign policy: it has never allowed its territory to be used for activities hostile to Bangladesh.

From India’s perspective, this clarification was essential. Dhaka’s interim government has repeatedly accused India of harbouring destabilizing forces, allegations New Delhi considers baseless and politically motivated.


Visa Centre Closures: A Rare and Costly Diplomatic Signal

One of India’s most consequential responses was the closure of multiple Indian Visa Application Centres (IVACs) across Bangladesh.

The main IVAC in Dhaka closed on December 16, followed by centres in Khulna and Rajshahi on December 18. Given that India issues millions of visas annually to Bangladeshi citizens—for medical treatment, education, employment, and tourism—this move carries substantial humanitarian and political consequences.

From India’s standpoint, the decision was not punitive but precautionary. Diplomatic missions are inviolable under international law, and any credible threat to their safety obliges the host country to act decisively. India’s action effectively communicated that if Dhaka cannot guarantee security, New Delhi will reduce its exposure.

Strategically, the closures also serve as a reminder of the asymmetry in people-to-people dependence: Bangladesh relies far more on access to India than vice versa.


Bangladesh’s Political Upheaval: The Roots of the Crisis

To understand the current crisis, India must look beyond December 2025 to August 2024, when Bangladesh underwent a dramatic political transformation.

The Fall of Sheikh Hasina

Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled Bangladesh amid massive student-led protests that spiralled into nationwide unrest. Approximately 1,400 people were killed during clashes between protesters and security forces, plunging the country into chaos.

For India, Hasina’s ouster marked the loss of a reliable strategic partner. Her government had consistently prioritized counter-terrorism cooperation, connectivity projects, and balanced relations with regional powers.

The Yunus-Led Interim Government

The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus has taken a markedly different approach. While presenting itself as a reformist administration, it has tolerated—or failed to suppress—radical political narratives, including anti-India rhetoric.

The November 2025 decision to sentence Sheikh Hasina to death in absentia for “crimes against humanity” further poisoned relations. India views the trial as politically motivated and has rejected Bangladesh’s repeated demands for Hasina’s extradition.


Hasina’s Presence in India: A Diplomatic Flashpoint

From Dhaka’s perspective, Hasina’s residence in India is a source of deep resentment. The interim government claims that her statements from Indian soil are inciting violence ahead of Bangladesh’s February 2026 elections.

India categorically rejects this accusation. New Delhi’s position is rooted in international law and humanitarian considerations: political asylum cannot be weaponized as a diplomatic bargaining chip.

However, India also recognizes that Hasina’s presence has become a rallying point for anti-India forces within Bangladesh, who portray New Delhi as complicit in Bangladesh’s internal politics.


India’s Military Counterbalance: Deterrence Without Provocation

While diplomacy remains India’s preferred instrument, New Delhi has simultaneously strengthened its military posture along the eastern frontier.

New Garrisons Along the Bangladesh Border

In November 2025, India operationalized three new military installations near the Siliguri Corridor:

  • Lachit Borphukan Military Station in Assam

  • Forward base at Kishanganj in Bihar

  • Forward base at Chopra in West Bengal

These installations enhance rapid deployment, intelligence collection, and real-time surveillance.

Strategic Assets in the Northeast

The region falls under the Tri-Shakti Corps, which integrates army, air force, and intelligence capabilities. India has positioned advanced assets including Rafale fighter jets, BrahMos missiles, S-400 air defence systems, and Akash surface-to-air missiles.

From India’s perspective, these deployments are defensive and deterrent in nature, aimed at preventing miscalculation rather than inviting confrontation.


Assam Chief Minister’s Intervention: Political Messaging with Strategic Undertones

Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma’s response to Abdullah’s threats was unusually blunt. He emphasized India’s status as a nuclear power and the world’s fourth-largest economy, warning that such rhetoric would not go unanswered.

Significantly, Sarma highlighted Bangladesh’s own geographic vulnerability—the narrow Rangpur Corridor connecting northern Bangladesh to the rest of the country. While India’s Siliguri Corridor is heavily fortified, Bangladesh’s internal connectivity is far more fragile.

From an Indian perspective, Sarma’s remarks served as a deterrent message: strategic vulnerabilities cut both ways.


Assessing Bangladesh’s Actual Capability to Threaten India

Indian strategic analysts are nearly unanimous in their assessment: Bangladesh lacks the military, economic, and diplomatic capacity to execute its threats.

The Siliguri Corridor lies entirely within Indian territory and is protected by layered security. India has developed redundant road, rail, and pipeline infrastructure to ensure uninterrupted connectivity.

Any attempt by Bangladesh to “isolate” the Northeast would require direct military confrontation with India—an outcome widely viewed as suicidal given the disparity in defence spending and capabilities.

Economically, Bangladesh benefits significantly from Indian transit access, trade, and energy cooperation. Disrupting these links would exacerbate Bangladesh’s already fragile economic situation.


The Geopolitical Dimension: Pakistan, China, and a Shifting Bangladesh

India is particularly concerned about Bangladesh’s warming ties with Pakistan and China. While Dhaka has the sovereign right to pursue diversified relationships, New Delhi sees a troubling convergence: anti-India rhetoric, Islamist political mobilization, and engagement with actors historically hostile to India.

For India, the crisis is not just bilateral; it is embedded in a broader contest for influence in South Asia.


Conclusion: A Critical Juncture for India–Bangladesh Relations

From India’s point of view, the Bangladesh-India diplomatic crisis is a warning sign of deeper instability in the eastern subcontinent. Threats to India’s Northeast, attacks on diplomatic norms, and the legitimization of extremist narratives represent a sharp departure from the cooperative framework built over the past decade.

India’s response—measured yet firm—reflects a dual strategy: diplomatic pressure combined with credible deterrence. New Delhi remains open to dialogue, but it will not compromise on territorial integrity, diplomatic security, or national sovereignty.

With Bangladesh’s elections approaching in February 2026, the trajectory of bilateral relations remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that India will recalibrate its policy toward Dhaka based not on historical goodwill, but on hard assessments of intent, capability, and behaviour.

The era of unquestioned strategic trust is over. What replaces it will shape the future stability of South Asia.

People Also Ask

What triggered the Bangladesh–India diplomatic crisis?

The crisis was triggered by public remarks from a Bangladeshi political leader threatening to support separatist forces against India’s northeastern states.

Why is India concerned about threats to the Siliguri Corridor?

The Siliguri Corridor is India’s only land link to the Northeast, making it a critical national security and strategic connectivity zone.

What steps has India taken against Bangladesh?

India summoned Bangladesh’s envoy, shut several visa centres, rejected hostile claims, and strengthened military deployments near the eastern border.

How has Sheikh Hasina’s exile affected India–Bangladesh relations?

Her residence in India has become a major friction point, with Bangladesh’s interim government accusing New Delhi of interference, which India denies.

Does Bangladesh have the capacity to isolate India’s Northeast?

Experts agree Bangladesh lacks the military, economic, and logistical capacity to isolate India’s Northeast without direct conflict with India.

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